Introduction
Do we have the 'right to die'? Can death be seen as being in a patient' s 'best interests?' The legal framework in the UK that concerns these questions includes the following statutes: the Suicide Act 1961, the Mental Capacity Act 2005, the Human Rights Act 1998, as well as case law. In particular, one case stands out, that of Ms B, who chose to have her ventilator withdrawn in the knowledge that this action would precipitate her death. In contrast to the often-encountered circumstance where withdrawal of treatment takes place in view of the perceived futility of intervention, Ms B could have conceivably continued to live and make the most of her life, even in the presence of a severe disability. As such, the act of withdrawing ventilation could potentially be viewed as assisted suicide. What should a responsible clinician do, if asked to withdraw or withhold the treatment in the knowledge that, if given, it would save or preserve a patient' s life? The judgment and the subsequent literature concerning the case of Ms B provide some answers, and inevitably raise some questions. This situation occurs occasionally in the intensive care environment and the knowledge of the ethical and medico-legal framework applicable to it is an asset to the involved practitioners.
Case history
Ms B was a 44-year-old woman of Jamaican ancestry. Although her childhood was said to be unhappy, through hard work she managed to lead a successful life. She worked as a social worker and had become team manager. In that capacity, she was appointed to a hospital where she was promoted to Head of the Department and Principal Officer for training and staff development. At the age of 41, she suffered a haemorrhage affecting her spinal cord. She had recovered, but given the possibility of a recurrence, she executed a Living Will stating that she would wish treatment be withdrawn should she suffer from a life-threatening condition, permanent mental impairment or permanent unconsciousness.
Two years following the first bleed, the symptoms returned and a spinal cavernoma was diagnosed. Ms B became tetraplegic. Shortly afterwards, she became dependent on mechanical ventilation. In spite of surgical intervention, she remained severely disabled. She was, however, able to move her head and articulate words. She pointed out the existence of the Living Will and asked for the ventilator to be switched off. 1 Her request was denied. After a couple of months on the intensive care unit (ICU), Ms B gave formal instructions to the hospital via her solicitor to remove artificial ventilation. This precipitated multiple assessments of her mental capacity. Initially, it was declared that she lacked capacity, but upon review, four months later, she was declared competent. In that period the patient was offered a one-way weaning plan and a transfer to the weaning centre, both of which she rejected.
The term one-way wean, refers to intentional, gradual reduction in ventilatory support that results in weaning from ventilation or death. Depending on the patient' s clinical condition, the chances of survival may be realistic or not. The one-way wean offered to Ms B potentially denied her the use of sedatives or narcotic drugs. Ms B refused transfer to the weaning centre and the one-way wean on the grounds of futility, knowing that the nature of her pathology precluded success, and on the grounds of perceived distress associated with this course of action in the absence of optimal sedation. She refused a hospice bed, knowing that her wish would not be granted there either. It took another six months before her decision was facilitated through the order of High Court judge, with her initiating all the legal proceedings.
The legal aspects of Ms B's case
The legal reasoning behind the judgment focused primarily on the patient' s capacity, the absence of factors that could diminish it, and on any ambiguity in the views expressed. The right to refuse treatment is corollary to the ability to consent to it. If the treatment is given in spite of competent refusal, it constitutes a trespass upon a person and possibly an assault. From the legal standpoint, the Mental Capacity Act was not yet in place but there were precedents in case law that examined the issue of capacity. 2 Based on that statement, the judgment in the case of Ms B naturally focused on the issue of her capacity to make the decision. Determining 'best interest' was not deemed to be an issue, as the patient was able to express her preference. While the case precedes the Mental Capacity Act 2005, the principles for assessing capacity exercised in the assessment of Ms B were similar to those laid out in the Mental Capacity Act 2005. 3 A person lacks capacity if they are unable to: • understand the information relevant to the decision • retain that information • use or weigh that information as part of the process of making the decision • communicate the decision.
Following consideration of the statements by the involved clinicians and expert witnesses, the Judge, 2 It has been questioned whether the abnormal ICU environment or presence of depressive illness could diminish capacity. Also, analogous to informed consent, the issue of informed refusal has been examined, as, having not experienced rehabilitation, the patient may not have had all the facts or indeed be in the frame of mind to make a decision. Also, ambiguities, such as appearing to be glad to be alive, allowing treatment bronchoscopy, or indeed participating in an assessment for rehabilitation were construed as not supportive of patient' s wish to withdraw treatment. The principles of judgment in Ms B' s case are reflected in the Mental Capacity Act 2005 that came into force in October 2007. 3 In accordance with MCA 2005, all adults are presumed to have capacity and even unwise decisions should be respected. This parallels the above-mentioned statements concerning the case of Re: Miss T. In the context of care in the intensive care environment, assessment of capacity and management of patients who lack capacity may require special considerations. The Intensive Care Society has published a useful guide to the MCA 2005. 4 While the clinicians looking after Ms B were not criticised for their actions, the hospital as an institution was. 5 Others felt the case set a legal precedent on withdrawing treatment in people with severe disabilities based on the values of the society at large. 6 While the legal process itself might not have been flawed, the judgment has met with a number of criticisms. The way the law operates is intrinsically deontological in nature. It is the process and adherence to the rules that matters, rather than the end result. If one considers the end result from a consequentialist point of view, a number of questions arise. Did Ms B have a right to die? What was better for Ms B: to respect her wish or to keep her alive as long as possible against her will, honouring the concept of sanctity of life? How is her death different from an assisted suicide? After all, it did involve an act of disconnecting the patient from the ventilator. Some commentators went as far as saying: 'For: if courts recognise a right to commit suicide by refusing treatment and allow or even require doctors intentionally to assist their patients to commit suicide thereby, the law' s prohibition on actively assisting suicide is gravely undermined.' 7 Given that, as a result of this ruling, an action has been taken that resulted in the death of a patient it is difficult to understand (from a consequentialist point of view) why Mrs Diane Pretty, a patient in somewhat similar predicament to Ms B, paralysed by motor neuron disease, was denied assistance with the manner of her death.
Mrs Diane Pretty was suffering from progressive motor weakness and faced a prospect of humiliating and unpleasant death. Mrs Pretty' s arguments for managing her own death were based on the Human Rights Act 1998, which in itself is a reflection of the European Convention of Human Rights. In particular she argued that refusal to allow assistance with her dying violated Articles 2, 3, 8, 9 and 14 of the Convention. Article 2 assures right to life and, as it has been argued by corollary, a right to death. Article 3 states that 'no one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.' Article 8 assures the right to respect for private Ethics and family life, which can be construed as a right to selfdetermination. Article 9 protects freedom of thought, conscience and religion. Finally, Article 14 provides prohibition of discrimination. Based on the above, Mrs Pretty attempted to seek immunity for her husband if he were to assist with her suicide. Suicide has been decriminalised in the UK. However, the Suicide Act 1961 prohibits aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the means of suicide. Being unable to perform the act herself, Mrs Pretty would in fact have required assistance equal to what might be viewed as consensual killing or voluntary euthanasia -an act of murder under English Law. Given such reasoning the courts, The House of Lords and eventually the European Court of Human Rights, while sympathetic to the individual, could not condone such an act. 8, 9 While the media reported that the patient was denied the 'right to die,' a more precise description would be that her husband was denied criminal immunity should he have assisted in her suicide. Further arguments stated that the Convention is constructed to protect certain rights rather than allow means of forgoing those rights. Once again the deontological nature of law prevailed, but the outcome for the individual was completely different.
More recently (in September 2010), and as a consequence of the legal precedents such as those discussed above, a Commission on Assisted Dying has been set up with the aim of investigating circumstances under which it should be possible for people to be assisted to die, determining safeguards and recommending the changes in the law if such are required or indeed possible. The Commission' s report has been published recently concluding that 'the current legal status of assisted suicide is inadequate and incoherent.' 10 Furthermore, concerning patients such as Ms B, ie non-terminal cases, the Commission was 'unable to reach a consensus on the issue whether a person who has had a catastrophically life-changing event that has caused them to be profoundly incapacitated should be able to request an assisted death...' 10 Although criticism could be leveled at the manner in which the Commission collected its evidence, one has to conclude that society at large is not yet able to address this problem.
Other notable cases of similar nature
Nancy B, a patient who challenged the legal system in Canada, requesting that her ventilator was turned off, died on 13th February 1992. 11 She suffered from severe generalised polyneuropathy as a consequence of Guillain-Barré syndrome. She spent two and half years on the ventilator and was deemed competent to make decisions on several occasions. As the hospital refused to turn off the ventilator, she sought an injunction permitting withdrawal of ventilation. The judge in that case questioned whether there was a case for negligence with such an act, and whether the act of withdrawal of the ventilator could constitute murder, manslaughter or suicide. His conclusions were that consensual withdrawal of treatment is not criminally negligent. Also, he felt that while homicide and suicide are not natural deaths, a death from a disease process leading to respiratory failure is. The shortcomings of the judgment have been noted, in that victim' s consent does not absolve the perpetrator from criminal responsibility. Furthermore, the very act of disconnecting the ventilator could be viewed as 'unlawful' if an 'unlawful act' is defined as an intentional act that reliably results in harm or injury. 12 
Professional guidance
It is telling that the General Medical Council (GMC) is at present consulting on guidance for the Investigation Committee and case examiners when considering allegations about doctors' involvement in encouraging and assisting suicide. 13 14 Indeed, the draft of the guidance reinforces the view of the law on suicide, but states at the same time that the Director of Public Prosecutions can exercise discretion when deciding whether to prosecute. The GMC further draws attention to the principle of medical professionalism as laid out in the Good Medical Practice. 15 Of note in the draft guidance is the statement: 'Respect for a patient' s autonomy cannot justify illegal action,' a point discussed earlier in the criticism of the Canadian ruling concerning Nancy B.
Conclusions
This case is not about wanting to die. This case is about not wanting to live. It is about autonomy and the right of selfdetermination, rather than a right to die. It is ultimately about paternalism and the way the society can impose its values upon an individual. The law does not support the 'right to die,' but it does support autonomy and the right to self-determination. However, the language and reasoning employed are allimportant as demonstrated by the contemporary case of Mrs Diane Pretty. The ethics of the law is deontological in nature. The fine line between respect for autonomy and safeguarding of an individual makes the subject of assisted suicide very controversial, regardless of jurisdiction. Intentions are important yet not sufficient to justify the act. Although given the case of Ms B, precedent exists, seeking legal counsel may be prudent in the event of a similar case, as well as involvement of the hospital authorities. Given the irreversible nature of the act, the decision to stop treatment requires thorough assessment of the capacity of the patient and the reasons behind the decision. This should be done promptly, preferably with the hospital rather than the patient or the family taking the initiative. Future cases of a similar nature are inevitable and will once more test Society' s attitudes towards withdrawal of therapy and assisted suicide.
